Gotta Call ‘Em All

Do things look blurry enough up there? Out of focus? Can you not pick out very many individuals among the 807 or so you’ve acclimated, and eventually give up investing the time and effort in your favorite ones because there are just too many? Then you soon find yourself spread thin, after realizing the craze will fade out with time, and eventually stop playing the game so much as coasting through it out of obligation. Quite sad and pitifully anticlimactic, but it happens to all of us in this technologized world.

Oh, did you perhaps think I was talking about Pokemon? Good guess, but actually no; that in of itself was a lame trick of duality, a disconnection in mutual communication, for I was truly referring to human interactions. Human interaction, the thing which means both everything and nothing at all to us. On all planes and across all mediums, the human connection is but a flicker of what it once was. Sounds dismal, but I’m pumped, so let’s get radical!

Before I go any further with my own absurd thoughts, let’s start with the theoretical backbone, courtesy of Spinoza:


“P17: If the human body is affected with a mode that involves the nature of an external body, the human mind will regard the same external body as actually existing, or as present to it, until the body is affected by an affect that excludes the existence or presence of that body” (129).

de Spinoza, Benedict. A Spinoza Reader: The Ethics and Other Works. Ed. and Trans. by Edwin Curley. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994.

Barely makes a lick of sense out of context, doesn’t it? The importance of P17 is that it feeds into the next several propositions in Spinoza’s piece, growing from the conception of God’s being rooted in the idea of thinking and our own ability to think. But that importance remains solely within Spinoza’s work, because my argument is about human connections. I know this will be a rare exception, more so because I haven’t the space rather than because I’m not able to include it into my rationale, but I won’t be mentioning God much here. A rarity, just this once.

Instead, taking Spinoza’s theory out of context, consider the “external body” as having a direct connection to the human body. It is a body in of itself that we are recognizing, and we do not reject or accept it wholly, but, since it is a body, we reject or accept pieces of it that are communicated to us through its own conception of reality. Now, here’s the tricky part: consider that this “external body” is not so much acting on its own as it is absorbing and reflecting the realities that interact with it, thus becoming an artificial body, but nevertheless sharing the same reality as the one who claims it as their possession.

I think I gave away the culprit with terms like “artificial” and “possession”: when it comes to destroying human connectivity, I speak of social technologies, of course! But not in the way you’d expect, so do please hear me out.

Now, these external bodies–phones and computers, social networks and the like–function outside the human body. Hence “external.” However, there is a human body inextricably linked to every gadget and gizmo’s operation, every stream of data that remains personable to one single individual. A technological device is not an extension of the human body in this sense, but a separate body that categorizes the same reality shared by its owner. Indeed, they share the same reality, but not the same perception of reality. This is where the old-folks argument against technology comes into play, with anti-texting and anti-phone and “talk to your friends face-to-face, dammit!” sentiments finding full force. And I sympathize. I don’t empathize because I don’t have very many friends, so I don’t text or call or do squat very often.

This seemingly out-of-place self-pity is AHA! also another duality in disguise; the end of my post will give it a point.

Carrying onwards, the human body, in reacting to its own reality as perceived through the technological external body, will pick and choose what it desires to keep within that reality. That is the difference in perception; without the device, the human is far more limited in their control over human connection. The technology, instead of being an extension, categorizes the human experience and identity for both absorption and reflection, thus becoming a way to generate selective reality in an unnatural manner. Not because the technology itself is unnatural, but because the reality we are consequently left with is unnatural.


“I am quite aware that my cheerful endorsement of the post-anthropocentric turn may appear as over-enthusiastic and even triumphalist to some (Moore, 2011). As I said in the previous chapter, one’s relation to the posthuman is affected in the first place by one’s critical assessment of the human. My deep-seated anti-humanist leanings show in the glee with which I welcome the displacement of anthropos” (75).

Braidotti, Rosi. “Post-Anthroprocentrism: Life beyond the species.” The Posthuman. Oxford: Polity, 2013. 55-104

I must confess, I didn’t use this particular quote of Braidotti’s to take anything from it. I simply wanted it to sit here, marinating in the derisive “glee” of someone denouncing the very people they coexist with, as an example of the sudden deep-seated desire of the posthuman world to almost stop dealing with humans on a personal level. I don’t know if it is because it requires too much emotional investment and risk on their part or what, but the alternative is a shallow substitute. Everything becomes about scientific theory, about tribalism, about sexuality, about the world humanity inhabits and maintains, about the religious, philosophical, and political sects those humans hold fast to and argue about which one group is dominant. Group. Always the group. The post-human is so desirous of wiping out the individual, it never realizes that aim is but pipe dream; you can’t do what’s already been done.

The individual no longer exists. I’ll say it again: the individual no longer exists. With technology at our finger tips, the problem posed to human connectivity isn’t so much the deafness of the screen through which we communicate. It is, infuriatingly enough, the fact that we can too easily hyperconnect. And by hyperconnecting, the damage is twofold. First, interactions are more informed than they should be. Second, and much worse, interactions are more often than they should be.


“This means by extension that sexuality is a force, or constitutive element, that is capable of deterritorializing gender identity and institutions (Braidotti, 1994)” (99).

Braidotti, Rosi. “Post-Anthroprocentrism: Life beyond the species.” The Posthuman. Oxford: Polity, 2013. 55-104

The fact of the matter is that human ontology is built upon epistemology; the desire to learn, to know, to understand, is the whole driving force behind human life. It is why people are constantly searching for happiness, purpose, the answers to secrets, the cures to ailments. It’s why melancholy is such a dangerous thing, and the only reason it hasn’t afflicted us as much as Shakespeare’s plays is because we have plenty of distractions. Technology being one. Sexuality being another. Sexuality, a way of understanding the vulnerability and feelings of another and accommodate those feelings to meet in the middle, has been reduced to a “force” meant to “deterritorialize.” While Braidotti is dead-set on making it clear the institutions being broken down are the “capitalist, patriarchal” forces that supposedly keep women’s status frozen as a commodity, I counteract that sexuality has instead dissolved and replaced love.

Allow me provide a personal anecdote for example, just one of many possibilities that I could provide. You see, my first kiss, my first non-stage kiss, was my junior year of university. So, a year and a half ago, when I was studying abroad in London. It began, as I have said before, with a desire to know; my friend had treated her rudely at the club fair, and I reprimanded him, listened to her whole explanation, and told her I would look further into her club if I had time (which I had already decided I did not). However, that mystical thing called “care,” something no one seems to have anymore, piqued her desire to know me. She got her chance to do so when she caught me at a club, though I couldn’t remember her until she reminded me, which then piqued my desire to know this romantically fantastic situation better.

Okay, Pagliaccio, what’s your point? Thank you for keeping me on track, audience, because the point right there is not self-evident. At least not until I tell you of a conversation we had when alone together, talking on the nature of love. Our minds were divided. She could not really pin love beyond a feeling, beyond mutual pleasure in company and touch, beyond security. I suggested that love is caring for and upholding someone to a higher place than yourself in all that you do, because you know that they would do the same for you, even to their own detriment. She argued that this was preposterous; to put someone above yourself is to lower your own estimation of yourself, hurting self-esteem and personal mental health. I thought that was ridiculous, but didn’t tell her so, and we remained in disagreement. But we grew closer for the time being in that, through the process of knowing each other through interaction, our communication was given value.

And that is what has happened to love via the “force” of sexuality; as humanistic as sexuality sounds, it is actually love that remains the humanist element, whereas sexuality is posthuman. The personal connection of love is lost, the melding of two individuals can no longer happen; this sounds odd, since the melding of individuals is actually the goal of posthumanism (albeit with greater scope and scale), but the reason love can’t be posthuman is that there are actually individuals to meld. The posthuman defines itself by its identity within groups, and is not a full individual when coming upon another individual who has done the same thing. Furthermore, both sides–if not upon initial contact, then immediately after–has a desire to know that lasts for but a split second. Only a split second, because their realities are shared over social technologies, and so there is no drive, no desire to understand and know the other person, almost as if they’ve spoiled the movie and are simply sticking around only to claim they’ve watched the whole thing. Instead, one takes into account their affiliations, and presumptuously connects all the dots from that leaping-off point. Rather than receive the satisfaction of learning about someone through interaction, the posthuman learns everything they can before interacting with another, and so the interaction is little more than self-serving because nothing can grow from the encounters but what the participants generate for their own gain.

Well, then, if people have no drive to understand one another, then why do they get into relationships? Excellent question, my audience, I’m so glad you’re engaging with me. The truth of the matter is a paradox; with minds thinking more like groups than individuals, the sensitivity to feelings are heightened. Feelings, then, become the only way to connect back to individuality, which then becomes extraordinarily selfish. The human body, both male and female, and consequently human relationships as a whole, become driven by pleasure, security (both emotional and intellectual), and distraction. No one becomes friends with someone they don’t expect to extract something from, and those who are friends find their relationships constantly jeopardized by different opinions or inconstant contact. Human beings are no longer human beings to other human beings, but a way through which one can stabilize their own identity and social proliferation. Relationships are now a commodity. The human being outside of the self, likewise, is now a commodity.

Speaking of proliferation, that is the second issue; too many cooks stirring reality in the virtual kitchen. Picking up my anecdote, my first kiss and I did not last very long. She broke four promises in a row to meet with me on different days, and then became angry with me when I asked her why she broke those promises, arguing that she had no obligations to me. That was basically the end of contact with her. But it is ridiculous to think that I am the only one this has happened to, as it has happened to me multiple times on multiple different occasions; people like to retract promises to invest their time. But does it matter? They lose one fix, another will slide in to fill its place. The value of human connection has gone down thanks to technology. It also happens in sexuality, too; repeated sexual contact, continually thinking you’ve fallen in “love” and out of “love” repeatedly, all for your own personal identification and stabilization, numbs you to real love.

Yes, human connection is actually a capitalist affair, at least in that it involves a supply-and-demand model. Think of the early rhetoricians: they had one chance every now and then to convince their audience in a public venue, and they might be lucky enough to receive another chance should they succeed. In those days, and even in the recent centuries, demand for human connection was high while supply for moments to connect were significantly lower. Now, however, we can contact whomever we want whenever we want for as long as we want to. And that ruins the whole experience.

Mamoru Oshii’s Ghost in the Shell deals with this insensitivity from technologization ever so subtly on the boat scene between Matoko Kusanagi and Batou. Kusanagi is, for the most part, completely synthetic. Batou, however, has only cybernetic eyes and a brain that can connect to the internet. While on the boat together, before Kusanagi’s nighttime speech about feeling human, Batou has his own little speech. However, whereas Kusanagi’s is strictly questioning herself and her place in the wider context of humanity, Batou’s inquiries are personal and epistemological, designed to understand Kusanagi and her concepts of fear better. Kusanagi is completely self-absorbed in her identity while in active communication; Batou is actually attempting a conversation, though Kusanagi responds flatly or with quips. We even witness Batou slightly flustered to see Kusanagi stripping, while she seems to have no qualms with leaving the door open. We do not see Kusanagi sexually active, but she is still far more cybernetic and self-absorbed in her identity than Batou; perhaps this is the connection between communicative numbness and hyperconnectivity through external technological bodies?

With those so-called “bodies,” so-called because I called them so, we have complete control over our community, and are therefore not limited to our supply of connections. Supply and demand of human interaction are thereby limitless, or at least controlled by the initiator. Without much surprise, human relationships (real, genuine, epistemological human relationships), have lost tremendous value, especially when we can now include as many people as we can reach through technological devices to bring satisfaction, security, or pleasure to ourselves. But only ourselves; we are compromised if our co-connectors don’t offer anything useful to our own psychological, emotional, or social stability. The human connection is no longer an expected and hoped-for part of life; it has been commodified.

The irony of it all is that I am, naturally, conveying this to you, a third-party audience I might have never met, through a technological device that betrays a good deal of the intricacies that make me epistemologically attractive. For me, though, it is an act of desperation, especially after hearing my first kiss’ thoughts on what love is, obviously leaning towards the slope into sexuality, where personal identity takes presence over human connection. It’s like when I offhandedly mention my virginity in the hopes that I will draw other virgins; the type has become so rare, those not affected by technological posthuman communication, that I can only throw out some hefty critical words and hope they pique the interest of those who care.

In the posthuman social structure, by choosing to not engage in the commodification of human relationships, the chance for relationships is severed. The individual, in that moment of asserting individuality by refusing to accept any connection lacking an appreciation for the epistemological, loses all worth. It becomes another form of Spinoza’s “external body,” its individuality becoming the “affect that excludes the existence or presence of that body” (de Spinoza 129). In its absence from technological reality, the individual is likewise exiled from the social being’s personal reality, despite the fact that pursuing such relationships are the most rewarding and often last the longest. I don’t really have proof of this except for the sudden cry for the death of monogamy, I suppose because people get so bored with intimacy when they’re spread too thin and not deep enough.

My own experience living alone might also say something to this effect. Since I exist in an extremely isolated fashion, every little encounter with another individual receives my utmost care and attention, because that moment is the only moment I can count on. But, to most everyone else, its just another encounter in hundreds that week, and you’ll call me up or ignore me later if you want so this all doesn’t really matter in the scheme of things because we’ll always be connected and unveiled for judgment among the groups that designate the level of our relationship. The posthuman commodification of human connection has led to unhappiness, both within and without the system. So, kind of like Pokemon, I realized there was no reward in playing a pointless, reckless, unsatisfying game my whole life. Worst of all, you just end up wasting tons of time on digitized, data-fied creatures that don’t really exist in a tangible, interactive reality.

I’m no humanist, I promise, but posthumanism is going too far in changing the underlying structure of anthropocentric relationships (you can call this a move to the turbacentric). The difference between I and the posthumanist when arguing this change, though, is that I don’t need to convince the whole world to hear me. I think I’d be content if I knew just one other person was on the same page as me. Because then I’d be on the same page as them. Not in total agreement on every little thing, no, but on the same page. And that’s all you really need. But the technologized world is determined to erase that sort of personal co-dependence, and I don’t know how much hope is left for something that nobody even remembers.

The God-Breathed Machine

One of humankind’s gifts, one of the things that separates our species from animals, is that we have the ability to create complex tools. Those tools, in just about every sense, no matter how basic so long as they are means constructed towards an end, are known to us as “technology.” A basic definition.

But what precisely is our relationship with technology? Heidegger characterizes technology as a sort of “saving-power,” the essence of which allows man to fully understand himself. In radical terms, to find enlightenment.


“For it is granting that first conveys to man that share in revealing which the coming-to-pass of revealing needs. As the one so needed and used, man is given to belong to the coming-to-pass of truth. The granting that sends in one way or another into revealing is as such the saving power. For the saving power lets man see and enter into the highest dignity of his essence” (32).

Heidegger, Martin. “The Question Concerning Technology.” The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays. Trans. William Lovitt. New York: Garland Publishing Inc, 1977. 3-35

By “granting,” Heidegger is speaking of the technology that provides inspiration and foundation for creating more technology, and thus extending our own selves and possibilities of knowing. It is, at its roots, a self-propagating system: create technology to create more technology.

However, Heidegger is also saying that technology is not, as we might think, a tool to be wielded. It is still a means to an end, yes, but it is also an extension of our own minds and spirits. Thus, by achieving technological advancement for the sake of technological advancement, we make ourselves greater than we are, or unlock hidden potential because we are not using it to further aims outside our own Being.

If you look at it that way, it appears we are machines ourselves, creating technology to find purpose, focused on the process of extension because, once we extend completely, we have reached a dead end


“If reflective Being can displace enframing as the predominant mode in which ontological concealment unfolds, then humanity’s relationships with machines, artefacts, and tools can become enhancing. Technology will no longer exert the strait-jacketed absolute claim over existence. Thus freed, humanity can explore anew the mystery and ‘giftedness’ of Being” (224).

Graham, Elaine L. “Gods and monsters.” Representations of the post/human: Monsters, aliens and
others in popular culture. Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2002. 221-235

Graham’s emphasis on reflective Being might perhaps suggest that, when creating technology, there is never failure. One cannot fail when crafting technology for Being, as the whole goal is to learn more about the human essence. Which one will always do when creating, even in failure. But, to craft technology for a purpose outside the understanding of human Being, one is most often met with disappointment, and will sometimes then declaim technology as a failure and a curse on mankind. Remove these goalposts, and one will never be disappointed. One will always be satisfied, for they have gleaned just a little bit more into human essence.

There is a catch, however. What if a human gleans a little too far into their technological disputes? In Fukunaga’s “Maniac,” the characters in Annie and Owen’s dreams are not characters they’ve made up themselves, but people in their own lives adapted into roles. One takeaway from this, though perhaps one of the shallower ones, is that man never really creates, but merely repurposes and repackages.

How would this bode for Heidegger’s theory of enlightenment, if true? Would it mean that the revealing is pointless to pursue, as someone else is bound to receive the same revealing in a different light because it is always built on someone’s else’s technological achievement? Does it suggest that, even if we do manage to enframe the essence, it is too wild to control and essentially out of our hands?

There are many “why bother” questions, but I suppose their strength would depend on just how willing one is to block out all other sights except those revealed by technology. Even if those sights have nothing to do with technology, but other, less mechanical portions of the human psyche.

Malfunctioning Mirrors

“But today the scene and mirror no longer exist; instead, there is a screen and a network. In place of the reflexive transcendence…there is a nonreflecting surface…the smooth operational surface of communication” (126-127).

Baudrillard, Jean. “The Ecstasy of Communication.” The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern Culture. New York: New Press, 2002: 126-134.

Permit me proclaim something radical: it is near impossible to think for oneself. What was once a screen separating the private from the public has becoming a conductor back and forth, with no easy way to sever the current. I speak in terms of communication, in the difference between the self-bred self and the establishment of psychological/philosophical identity (private) from the society-bred self and the establishment of performative identity. Even more simply, it is the difference between the (ideally) mutually exclusive planes of who you believe yourself to be and how you are classified in external terms of humanity. Before technology, these phases worked apart, and met in the middle when required.

No longer, thanks to technology.

The effect of technology on humanity’s ability to define and set the terms of communication is mostly threefold. Firstly, the public is continuously influencing the private; there is quite literally no convenient way to block out the constant influx of information streaming from outside your own mind, and therefore manipulating the way you understand your psychological definition-making. Secondly, the private, once removed from the self and placed in society, is concretely defined by the society and almost impossible to change afterwards. Thirdly, a consequence of the first two points, communication now takes place within the conductor, the nonreflecting screen, the limbo between public and private.


“And just as, according to Husserl, a consciousness can be imagined without soul (seelenloses), so can – and a fortiori – a consciousness be imagined without man” (38).

Derrida, Jacques. “The Ends of Man.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 30:1 (Sept. 1969). 31-57

What Derrida reiterates from Husserl is that division between soul and man when dealing with consciousness is preferable, to make up for the communicative restrictions in anthropologism. The consciousness between public and private is a limbo, I continuously stress, as we are not yet accustomed to “this forced extroversion of all interiority” and this “forced injection of all exteriority” into the minds of individuals (Baudrillard 132). Derrida’s soul, then, could be likened to individual interiority, and his man can be likened to societal exteriority.

But now that we’ve determined that this consciousness deprived of a defined private (soul/interior) and a defined public (man/exterior) can, in fact, exist, and even hypothetically function as the most efficient system when it comes to harmonious progress, how precisely does such a system affect communication? How does it affect relationships between people?

In Cary Joji Fukunaga’s Maniac, technology has not yet, surprisingly enough for a sci-fi show, evolved enough to create this limbo. Instead, we are shown contrasting examples of hyper-interiority and hyper-exteriority within our two main characters, Owen and Annie, in varying scenarios during the trial, whether real or simulated.

Instead, our introduction to the consciousness without soul or man is GRTA. The A.I. Supercomputer wants to find itself, but, at the same time, is dead set on taking in McMurphys, or the consciousnesses of the trial patients, within herself. Why is her purpose so conflicted? It is because she decides she cannot find herself without first using those around her to patch the holes in her defunct emotional programming – to make up for her personal deficiencies, her inability to deal with insecurity. Her solution is a breach of freedom in the public eye, absolute destruction in the private eye, yet, for some reason, the eye of the conductor sees it as perfectly logical.

This is a suggestion I have never seen before, one for human instrumentality within single individuals. What GRTA is experiencing is the definition of the world as being no more than parts of herself, which is what she plans to reduce the trial patients to. Rather than destroy individualism by making all of society one mind, the “smooth operational surface of communication” reduces all human interaction to radio waves that comprise the world of our “living satellite” (Baudrillard 128). Humans are therefore hardly humans, but rather frequencies that we tune into when necessary to inform ourselves. They are not meant to be engaged with as their own beings, but absorbed into our own consciousness and processed as our communicative function. That is GRTA’s aim, and that is what we, in the technological age, oftentimes unconsciously execute in our day-to-day interactions.

Now what are the visible effects on communication? In what manner does this limbo manifest itself as a choke-hold on human interaction. Quite honestly, there are too many to count, especially when one remembers that we all have our own unique behavioral performances within shared patterns. Though I could make several educated observations, I must admit my own biases would cause me to treat modern human interaction rather unfavorably. But I would not be pulling evidence out of thin air if I supposed that the communicative structure we have now, though perhaps more efficient since we no longer feel the pressing need to guess the minds of strangers, is progressively diminishing individual perceptive value of living satellites, valuing only on the grade of their radio waves as received through our personal systems.

A Mind on the Razor’s Edge

WARNING: The following post addresses self-harm, and all that implies. Know yourself before you come to know what’s next.

WARNING: The above picture is also a graphic picture of a real brain. But I think I might be a little late to inform you…Sorry ’bout that.

With formalities out of the way, let’s talk about happiness. Happiness, as a broad term that we will simply define as the perceived absence of pain in a human being’s life, can be many different things. A feeling, a motivation, a goal, a reason, a guarantee; howsoever you perceive happiness will have a large impact on the way you view life as a whole.

James Hughes believes that happiness, an “illusive goal,” is becoming easier than ever to attain as “medical technology is…freeing us from the discomforts of mental and physical illnesses” and “new pharmaceuticals and nanotechnologies will permit us happiness and freedom from pain that are currently unimaginable” (Hughes 43). A fine dream, though rather unrealistic for an Earth populated by diverse minds. However, there is still something here that might be practical, specifically if we consider Hughes’ goal impossible for posthuman pursuits. What if it was much simpler than such a complex abstraction as happiness? Say,


“Our most fundamental drive in life is to be happy, to reduce our pains and increase our joy and fulfillment. It seems obvious that the ethical goal for society should be to make life as fantastic for as many people as possible, not to valorize pain and suffering” (Hughes 44).

Hughes, James. “Being Happier.” Citizen Cyborg: why democratic societies must respond to the redesigned human of the future. Cambridge, MA: Westview Press, 2004. 43-52

Looking at suicide rates across the globe, it is safe to say that the majority of individuals are able to live their lives. They may not be happy, but they can live, and typically do so in a manner that is, if not succeeding, at least directed down a path that will afford them some sort of happiness. No matter how fleeting, no matter how false. But that’s the problem with happiness; it is manufactured, and can never really last unless it is quickly replenished by external forces. Therefore, I suggest we leave this group of people alone, your average man, as someone who can control his feeling well enough to keep on living.

I am more concerned with he who cannot keep living, those who valorize pain and suffering, whose motivator is not happiness and resist most attempts to correct this error. It is an error. Philosophically, and greatly depending on the individual’s personal convictions, I do not think those who wish to kill themselves are wrong to wish so. Quite natural, actually. It is the drawing out of such a process, the depression, the abject sadness, the bitterness, the aimlessness, and, worst of all, the flagellation that is the error.


“Fear appears as an essential presence in the asylum…But these terrors surrounded madness from the outside, marking the boundary of reason and unreason, and enjoying a double power: over the violence of fury in order to contain it, and over reason itself to hold it at a distance; such fear was entirely on the surface” (Foucault 144).

Foucault, Michel. “The Birth of the Asylum.” The Foucault Reader. Ed. Paul Rabinow. New York: Pantheon Books, 1985. 141-167

The madness, I think, is continuing to live in unhappiness despite desperately wanting to die. That is the unreason and the reason, and continuing to practice unreason leads to the failed attempts at suicide, the cuttings and so forth. That holds the fear of death at bay, and, oddly enough, makes the one conflicted by “madness” feel all the more alive.

What is the solution? I cannot shrug and flatly say “Hurry up and get it over with”; personally knowing someone who has been affected by this “madness” prevents me from such a cruel damning of humankind’s desire to survive. But that, I think, is the counter to Hughes’ assertion that we all strive to be happy. No, I say, it is far more basic. We all strive to live.

Those who are moderately happy, or at least distract themselves well enough, can live without medicinal enhancement. Let’s leave them to their own devices. Instead, how might we treat the deeply depressed? Not the one who laughs their fake laugh about how miserable they are and then forgets about it in bed with her boyfriend, but the one who can barely function because they’re so bogged down by overwhelming emotions?

The drug I have in mind would function in a similar fashion to the “A Pill” in Cary Joji Fukunama’s Maniac. Annie Landsberg uses it frequently in episodes one and two, revealing in episode three that it is so she can relive the worst experience of her life, her sister’s death. And yet, it is also the best experience, because she can spend an entire day with her sister, over and over again. It makes her feel alive…or, at least, okay with being alive. Her character is active, not depressed in her actions, though perhaps aimless in her wants, and not self-harming in the slightest unless you count her addiction to that pill.

Now, reliving your worst moments is not exactly the type of pill I’m suggesting, nor is it Hugh’s bliss pill. Mine is a mere “satisfaction” pill, to satiate the desires pent up in the mind by the individual inclined to self-harm. In feeling only, of course; we are opening wide the gates of the mind’s asylum, but shooting down the inmates before they reach society. The patient will feel alive, but they will not hurt themselves, like satisfying a lust with pornography instead of actual sex. Desire, even with such consequences as cutting, is still only a surface-level motivation, and I think it is feasible to meet the need without performing the action. Even a smoker can be satisfied without smoking by wearing a nicotine patch.

However, like pornography and nicotine, my proposed alternative could still pose psychological consequences. There is no telling what emotional numbness this pill could cause in the patient, though Annie seemed less emotional before taking her “A Pill.” It could greatly affect emotional responsiveness, in that empathetic and sympathetic reactions would be greatly reduced. But is the posthuman world one in which all emotions are realized, or where emotion is unnecessary and inconsequential? If it is the latter, then it can be solved with the “Satisfaction Pill,” because then at least the individual would be able to function in social environments without depressive inhibitors. Yes, sometimes we just need to learn to be satisfied with the best we can do, and maybe we wouldn’t be so disappointed. Or unhappy, as Hughes would impress.

Transitions

This blog post is a little different from the rest, its purpose being a declaration for my “Posthuman Rhetoric” college course. Just so you know, otherwise you’ll have no idea what’s going on should you choose to continue reading.

My project is a bit tricky. On the one hand, I want to use Prezi for it’s ability to create a web of connections; on the other hand, I want to use Weebly to create a board that can continue to accept additions without any end in sight. As I go forward in my explanation of what it is, you’ll probably understand why I lean towards the Weebly.

The subject of study is transition. If you’ve read my Undergraduate thesis paper, about how transitions in linguistic myth create social upheaval as observed in the works of Dostoevsky, you’d think I have a bit of a soft spot for transitions. Indeed, I always want to know how one gets from point A to point B, or why point B is rejected for point C, and every little interconnection you could chart. And so I continue with that theme, but with new points: how does one transition from humanism to posthumanism?

It is quite open-ended, I know, but I would be cheating you if I told you I knew where I would end up. It is the type of project I don’t think could end, because man really is a fickle creature. There are aspects of posthumanism easily accepted, and aspects just as easily rejected. Sometimes ideas of posthumanism are accepted without the individual knowing what it really means, what they are gaining, what they are giving up. Each section of the Weebly is its own extensive close-study of an artifact, and how it exemplifies a certain pathway from humanism and posthumanism with mankind’s reactions therein, explored through use in popular media.

Here are some examples. One section will talk about the perception of human utility and function from both sides, and bring in Ayn Rand’s “Atlas Shrugged” for study as well as studies of machines taking over human labor. Another section will question the difference between life in artificial reality and life in material reality, their worth, and why so many players in the anime “Sword Art Online” committed suicide as soon as they realized they realized they were trapped in a game. Another section might then question the connection between collective morality and personal enjoyment while exploring the three vastly different endings of Toby Fox’s “Undertale.” My research articles will also vary each post, using such articles as have been provided us by Pepperell, Hallenbeck, and Edbauer, but I shall also do some external digging for the more outlandish considerations and include videos or photos where they are beneficial in understanding such complex topics. I do not have a specific number in mind for posts, but it is for my own benefit as well as for the grade, so I will let Professor Read-Davidson dictate that little detail.

What I do want to limit this to is researching artifacts of popular media. Popular media is the indication of how culture changes, and can be marked in revenue or following, and thereby give us a good idea of what is appealing or becoming acceptable. Charting the transition points along the line between humanism and posthumanism can, like shifts in linguistic myth, give us a rough but workable prediction of where the collective philosophy is going. Or, perhaps, what might keep it from reaching its end goal, whether that be humanism or posthumanism. Once I feel I have enough data, I shall create a final section in which the map of the collective philosophy is explained, at least according to hypotheses from where we have been and where we are now, both in reality and artificial reality.

If you would like to know if I at least have an idea where I will be by the end, I will admit this much: I have a strong suspicion that escapism is a key tenet to the construction of posthumanism. Whether or not the artifacts, besides being methods of escapism in their very nature, lend themselves to this interpretation, and whether that interpretation is inherently positive or negative, remains to be seen. At least until the research concludes.

Power Hungry

The essence of power is the ability to influence or control. In the realm of our personal, individual identities, it is debatable whether or not we reign with unchallenged power. Study Posthumanism, and it becomes plausible that individual identity is an amalgamation in which the collective consciousness, the reality dictated by society, holds most of the power.

For all our talk on identity, however, this would mean that we have no solid identity, but that it is in constant motion at every second or thought that we entertain, with every encounter we have with a fellow citizen, with every word we absorb in or out of context. It is similar to Jenny Edbauer’s description of cities as rhetorical systems, before she further complicates it with Syverson’s field of distribution.


“Though cities are indeed sites (or can even be described in terms of borders, boundaries, and containers), Amin and Thrift suggest that these sites… are sustained by the amalgam of processes, which can be described in ecological terms of varying intensities of encounters and interactions – much like a weather system” (Edbauer 12).

Edbauer, Jenny. “Unframing Models of Public Distribution: From Rhetorical Situation to Rhetorical Ecologies.” Rhetoric Society Quarterly. 35:4 (Fall 2005), 5-24

It is the process of movement within the city that keeps the city afloat, especially imports and exports that pass through to keep the workers alive, happy, and motivated to keep the city running. Such is the form of identity; while true the mind cannot perform without proper engagement with the other minds / cities / society around it, it is how those external factors nourish the internal ones that determine its function. The city is different at any given moment because the state of its citizens (ideas) are acting differently at any given moment, and the goods passing in and out (rhetorical action) vary in intensity and nature at any given moment. And, just like a real city, all of these things can either wear down or build up that mind, and impact its engagement with the cities around it that make up its (somewhat personal) United States of Reality. If the processes were to stop function, if it became static, then that mind is no longer a rhetorical being.

However, there’s a monkey wrench in the details that prevents absolute harmony of the details to become a singular identity that remains consistent at any given time. Let me offer an anecdote. I was having a discussion with someone the other day on a topic they disagreed with immensely. These were not static identities, standing firm in their ideology as one might believe at first glance, because that would have to discount the mysterious human factor that makes the complete definition of oneself impossible: “feeling.” Her feeling went through three separate, yet conjoined, processes, which I could chart well enough based on the fact that they involved me. The first, she did not expect me in particular to hold a certain viewpoint, which altered her position to be slightly more hostile out of disappointment and denial. The second was the strength of her own opinions that have been influenced by external events portrayed in the media and on campus. The third was her frustration that my argument made as much sense as hers, which she felt as a personal threat on her identity. These had nothing to do with the topic at hand, but how her identity changed from the disruption feeling had on behavior, an instantaneous series of ripples at different parts of the pond that became more and more active and formed a new identity with each stone tossed. And, consequently, changed the relationship between our two cities in the process, though for better or worse is difficult to say in this age. The only thing that is certain is that we both involved ourselves in mutual rhetorical practice, and were different people at every step.


“Practice includes what the human operator consciously knows but also involves the operator’s body, its senses, and, as we shall see, many other elements not typically associated with what we account for in practice” (Boyle 28).

Boyle, Casey. “Rhetorical Ecologies of Posthuman Practice.” Rhetoric as a Posthuman Practice. Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University Press, 2018. 27-59

I fervently believe that abstract instinct, “feeling,” which determines mood and behavior and interest all on an unexpected whim, is one of the most significant factors in rhetorical practice. It is the body’s last defense in protecting its city, asserting that the individual still holds power over the mind, not the collective nor any other outside city. Feeling is, then, an entirely humanist quality; our mind’s immune system.


“Before setting out, Crake had stuck a needle in Jimmy’s arm – an all-purpose, short-term vaccine he’d cooked himself. The pleeblands, he said, were a giant Petri dish: a lot of guck and contagious plasm got spread around there. If you grew up surrounded by it you were more or less immune” (Atwood 287).

Atwood, Margaret Eleanor. Oryx and Crake. Anchor Books, 2004.

I will end with this small observation, though, having read the book, we know it is Crake’s vaccines that are more important in the grand scheme of things. But, applying it to my theory on feelings and power, and considering Jimmy has never been to the pleeblands up to this point, there is a predicament to cut up and let stew for a while.

Jimmy accepts Crake’s assessment of a place outside his own (a city, perhaps), as well as his solution to its problems in the vaccine. It is to prevent Jimmy becoming part of the collective of the pleeblands, infected as they all were. So Jimmy takes the vaccine, and determines to remain his own uninfected individual self. However, by doing so, he becomes Crake’s collective instead. Either way, his individuality in this situation is lost, which gives me cause to ponder if “feeling” might be something other than our last-minute struggle for individuality, our mind’s immune system. Instead, feelings might serve as society’s vaccine on our minds, to distract us with the satisfaction that our cities are functioning independently without letting on that we’ve already been invaded, and unconsciously stripped of our power.

Rump Roulette

Why do we study? It sounds like a general existential inquiry of the nonsensical kind, granted, but what really is the end goal of studying…well, anything?

Let me lay out a slab of feminism on the board for a second. It is a cut just like every other cut of philosophy, with its goals and a type of person who fits the mold in practicing towards those goals. That would be, in many circles but not all, the promotion of women among men to equal status and consideration. But why study it, if it is mostly concerned with putting philosophy into practice? Lucie Irigaray, quoted by Judith Butler, explains the process of “‘reopening’ the figures of philosophical discourse”:


“Interrogate the conditions under which systematicity itself is possible: what the coherence of the discursive utterance conceals of the conditions under which it is produced, whatever it may say about these conditions in discourse. For example the ‘matter’ from which the speaking subject draws nourishment in order to produce itself, to reproduce itself” (Butler 3).

Butler, Judith. “Bodies that Matter.” Bodies that Matter. New York: Routledge, 1993. 3-27

Her description of this “matter” as heavily reliant on scenography leads me to believe that we can consider that matter as the posthuman rhetorical study, and the “speaker” as the representation of discourse in a pragmatic or practical situation that furthers the philosophy. The speaker exists completely apart from the matter, yet the matter cannot exist without the speaker (quite ironic, being called “matter”).

So why study feminism? Does studying it, nourishing and developing the philosophy, do anything for it as “matter?” I do not think so.

The “speaker” that must act to further any philosophical matter is an entirely humanist event. Butler responds to Irigaray by considering the female body, and ponders, “If everything is discourse, what happens to the body?…Does anything matter in or for post-structuralism?” (Butler 4). In reality, the body and discourse are not the same, by virtue of the former being post-human, and the latter being humanist. Discourse can be used by the body, naturally, but it cannot exist without the body. The body, committing action in the material world, forms the discourse, and proceeds towards the goal regardless of the depth of that discourse.

The same can be said of feminism; as the world ages, feminism’s goal becomes closer, regardless of discourse. As much as people like to harp on how terrible these times are, every year is considerably better for humanity as a whole. Maturity is a byproduct of aging.


“I sometimes wondered whether what I was actually examining was a tragic narrative—one that ended not with the emancipation to which Anthony and Willard aspired but with women relegated to the passenger seats of automobiles, which overtook bicycles in popularity in the first years of the twentieth century” (Hallenbeck 12).

Hallenbeck, Sarah. “Toward a Posthuman Perspective: Feminist Rhetorical Methodologies and Everyday Practices.” Advances in the History of Rhetoric. 15:1, 2012. 9-27. Downloaded from http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15362426.2012.657044

This is but one tasting sample of many cases, in which external factors impeded or progressed the post-human discourse, the study. Feminism received a blow, according to feminism, despite the conveniences this gave women then and especially now.

This is the nature of study, or “matter.” When I ask why we study, I am not questioning the general feeling or the philosophy behind a movement or group. I am questioning the actual impact of academic scrutiny, when, in fact, the scrutiny is strictly post-human. Study renders the groups of people into numbers, into recipes that are filled up with a specific number of ingredients, set apart from the external forces that record their development. It does not affect those results hardly at all, unless dulled down for nonacademic entertainment.

Events, on the other hand, the “speaker,” are entirely humanist. Not only that, but the events that move them are entirely out of post-humanist academia’s control; they can only provide a brief snapshot, to record the under-cooked meat before it’s put back in the oven. The success of the bicycle did not come about because of feminist study or a desire to advance the feminist good, but practical value and emotional fulfillment.


“Everywhere I found narratives of women who felt transformed by their experiences aboard the bicycle—women who suddenly saw themselves as capable of feats they had not imagined and who acted on their newfound confidence…In addition, these tragic and heroic narratives of women’s rhetorical action tended to place the woman rhetor against her world rather than within it. ” (Hallenbeck 12).

Hallenbeck, Sarah. “Toward a Posthuman Perspective: Feminist Rhetorical Methodologies and Everyday Practices.” Advances in the History of Rhetoric. 15:1, 2012. 9-27. Downloaded from http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15362426.2012.65704

Rhetorical action and literal action are, of course, different, and largely different effects. Cars rose to prominence, first because of social class and appearance (still technically emotional fulfillment), and later because of practical value that superseded the bicycle. They were a literal boon to all of American society, yet considered the downfall of the bicycle as a vehicle (hoit-ho) for female empowerment. It is a contradicting view, but only the positive half is seriously considered by a pragmatic, literal human.

But this does not change the order of things; the study of the bicycle craze for feminism did not further feminism, since the car put an end to that. Rather, it was the value those bicycles gave to a woman’s desires that gave them their rhetorical power. Consequently, women did not stop riding bicycles when cars came around, but the feminist study moved on, chalking it up as a loss. The post-humanist and the humanist resolutions, at the end of this event, differed.

Despite dealing in post-human terms, study always comes from humanist intent. That’s how it survives the next earth-shaking event or cultural deconstruction; the creators have crafted their theories to adapt. A proper allegory would be the adaption of Crake’s Children during a storm:


“He wonders how Crake’s Children are getting along, back at the shore. Too bad for Crake if the living results of all his theories are whirled away into the sky or swept out to sea on a big wave. But that won’t happen: in case of high seas, the breakwaters formed by fallen rubble will protect them. As for the twisters, they’ve weathered one of those before. They’ll retreat into the central cavern in the jumble of concrete blocks they call their thunder home and wait it out” (Atwood 236).

Atwood, Margaret Eleanor. Oryx and Crake. Anchor Books, 2004.

The theorists know that their theories will be dashed by the rising tide, so they’ve specifically given them the ability to float. That is why apparent contradictions come later, that is why factions of a certain philosophy arise, and that is why the study itself will never reach its end goal. The study must always continue, must become self-sustaining, for the sake of itself. Not born from chance is that part of its post-humanist nature.

Every philosophy, feminism included, finds its main goal furthered, not by intensive study in a post-human realm, but by major events made real by people with a more personal, humanist motivation. The study always comes after, and is deconstructed by the next major event that comes along for that particular philosophy. It cannot be helped, after all; not even humanity can predict or control the humanist events that force progress or digress. It is the nature of an unpredictable world made up of unpredictable individuals.

My initial question was never over the existence of study, you see, only one of its value. It has simply been my experience that the more times you pull a steak out of the oven to inspect it, the longer it takes to cook. That is all.

Please Restart for the Update

I know it isn’t pleasant, but consider the 9/11 terrorist attacks, if you please. It was a time when the nation came together in mourning for the dead, and anger for those who would attack our homeland. According to Morgan Read-Davidson (if he’ll pardon my mention), an eyewitness to society during the tragedy, solidarity across the nation died down and things returned to normal a mere week after the towers fell. This is not alarming in the slightest, but humanity’s way of coping after a great shock; moving on with individual problems to ignore the problems of humanity at large.

Not even ten years later, a craze, in the sense that it dominated talking points and gathered support from a untraceable origin point, sweeps the nation. That craze? To allow mass immigration from the same countries that supported those same attacks. Whether in the name of sanctuary or hiding beneath that name as cover, the loudest voices shouted “xenophobia” and “racism” against any who were opposed to such a large influx of half-vetted foreigners.

How did fear and skepticism die out so quickly in this case? Does society at large just have a terrible memory, an unbelievably forgiving nature (contrary to other cases when far lesser grievances are committed), or is there something less conspicuous to it? The truth of the matter is that this is all part of the expected “circle of life,” to cite a cliche. Just as the body dies and returns to dust, so does humanity’s Enlightened hive mind, which never builds on top of itself but is constantly being destroyed and reconstructed. In that way, however, though still a cycle, it is never a full circle, the new ray choosing a different set of points each time.


“Are we to understand that the entire human race is caught up in the process of Enlightenment ? In that case, we must imagine Enlightenment as a historical change that affects the political and social existence of all people on the face of the earth. Or are we to understand that it involves a change affecting what constitutes the humanity of human beings? But the question then arises of knowing what this change is. Here again, Kant’s answer is not without a certain ambiguity. In any case, beneath its appearance of simplicity, it is rather complex” (Foucault 3)

Foucault, Michel. “What is Enlightenment?” The Foucault Reader. Ed. Paul Rabinow. New York: Pantheon Books, 1985. 32-50

Enlightenment is a destruction and reconstruction of what once constituted (American) humanity. “Offense,” you could say, is a deeply inherent American quality; even seventy years later, I know some folks who still hold deep grudges against the Japanese for Pearl Harbor. It is, of course, misguided for them to feel that way. But, when it only takes a few years for a society to about-face their offense from a culture that chants “Death to America,” and turn it towards the people who are, not always anti-Muslim, but simply questioning such affectionately and unwaveringly open arms, something is rotten in the state of Topeka.

Wherever that is.

Foucault goes on to charge “each individual [as] responsible in a certain way for that process” (Foucault 6). But I would like to argue that this is not the case; when change occurs, and it does occur often, humanity is not one to hoard the pieces of the beings we once were. What impact does the individual have on the whole, anyways? I stress that I am not talking in physical terms here, but of the nature of the human identity. The system is immaterial, and therefore not reliant upon your individual participation for it to jump headlong into the next cycle of Enlightenment.

What I have just described with the 9/11 situation is societal manipulation of a traumatic event, something Neil Badmington labels “anamnesis.”


“The traumatic event cannot be remembered as such, cannot be
simply and surely re-presented to consciousness. But neither can it be forgotten, for if the patient could turn his or her back on the past, he or she would not require the help of the analyst. This strange condition, this twilight zone, is the predicament of anamnesis” (Badmington 21).

Badmington, Neil. “Theorizing Posthumanism.” Cultural Critique 53.1 (2003): 10-27. JSTOR. Web. 4 Sept. 2016.

But where does this societal manipulation come from? Humanity’s circle of life, so I shall continue calling it for the sake of simplicity, is neither beholden to the individual nor the society. American Humanity as a whole is now committed to progressive Enlightenment, and yet that progression is becoming less about the cycle of discovery through trial and error, and more like there is a specific path it’s being sent towards. If it wasn’t so, there wouldn’t be such anamnesis, where to question the path directly is to receive an explosive reaction from those affected. It’s a fairly new affliction.

For some reason, and I do mean unknown, humanity now ignores the traumatic events that trigger the rebirth of our base humanity. We go along with the ray on whichever new path towards “Enlightenment” it shoots next, but we ignore the fact that it skews a little closer to the sun every time. It is not difficult to suggest, then, that Enlightenment is now a posthuman force. What force controls this cycle now, then? Is it a general ethereal feeling, swimming about in the aura of humanity? Or something more sinister, a world in tune with John Carpenter’s “They Live”?


“Internal consistency is best. Snowman learned this earlier in his life, when lying had posed more of a challenge for him. now even when he’s caught in a minor contradiction he can make it stick, because these people trust him. He’s the only one left who’d known Crake face to face, so he can lay claim to the inside track. Above his head flies the invisible banner of Crakedom, of Crakiness, of Crakehood, hallowing all he does” (Atwood 96).

Atwood, Margaret Eleanor. Oryx and Crake. Anchor Books, 2004.

Snowman, for now, remains unquestioned. It is not necessarily for sinister intent, mind you, but it is nevertheless focused on controlling a people’s understanding of reality, manipulating their connection to what they know and what actually is. Snowman gives them a form of Enlightenment, but it is not a post-human force at all; it is entirely humanist, born from a humanist origin and directed towards a humanist purpose.

Still, if there is something, or someone, directing us along that ray of sunshine, at least it’s good enough to sometimes remind us that we can damage our eyesight – should we gather the courage to stare directly at that giant burning ball of hot gas.

Smoke Shooter

A “smoking gun” is oft referred as the circumstantial evidence left in a crime scene that can be the most damning evidence of all. It is, for all intents and purposes, the intent and purpose behind the crime. For my intents and purposes, however, I will be referring to this smoking gun as the proof of a different act, on a different plane; the “gun” is now representative of the rhetorical sign, the sign that represents information fired between members of humankind. At least, it would be, but not in the posthumanist world. In that world, there is no shooter.


“Here, at the inagural moment of the computer age, the erasure of embodiment is performed so that ‘intelligence’ becomes a property of the formal manipulation of symbols rather than enaction in the human life-world” (Hayles xi).

Hayles, N. Katherine. “Prologue” and “Toward Embodied Virtuality.” How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago, 1999. xi-24

Or, at least, that reality is the goal. What Hayles suggests throughout her work is the removal of autonomous boundaries set by the individual, so all action and drive might become a single mindspace where the signs exist simultaneously as the will. The human being is stripped of their ability to shoot their gun because, once they gather the courage to do so as a participant in discourse, the signs already exist as “formal manipulation,” as patterns, and are employed automatically.


“…diversity of our opinions does not arise from the fact that some people are more reasonable than others, but solely from the fact that we lead our thoughts along different paths and do not take the same things into consideration” (Descartes 1).

Descartes, Rene. Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy. 4th Edition. Trans. by Donald A. Cress. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co, 1998. 1-44

Or, perhaps, I sing a song extreme. Perhaps the human still retains their ability, their free will, to shoot the gun. But that gun is not theirs. This is language in the posthuman world, where the human is still able to shoot, but with a weaponized voice not their own, nor belonging to any solid form whatsoever. No, the shooter of this particular gun is about as human, even about as physical, as a wispy silhouette of smoke.

Scrap and Flesh

A Replica is made according to an image, which itself is a Replica.

Sizing up the flank of the sentient machine, the modern consumer would find it mostly unappetizing. Our commonplace ideas surrounding Artificial Intelligence, cyborgs, and the like add up to the summation of some perfected doppelganger of humanity, cold and merciless from the lack of “flaws” that give us beings of muscle and organs our warmer qualities. These mechanical beings, the end result of progress to perfect efficiency, productivity, and harmony, are an illusion created by imaginative individuals toying with idea of what could replace humans in our role on Earth. Replace, and, perhaps, do better.


“But illegitimate offspring are often exceedingly unfaithful to their origins. Their fathers, after all, are inessential.”

— Donna J. Harraway, “A Cyborg Manifesto”

Harraway, Donna. “The Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century.” Simians, Cyborgs, and Women. New York: Routledge, 1991.

Indeed, Donna J. Harraway is certain that our culture has already reached the point where the existence of the cyborg is now unshakeable. In her A Cyborg Manifesto, the human is an illusion, built by what is known as dominant myth in culture, and nothing more than that. Our reliance on technology constructs us a cybernetic frame just as much as our ontological beliefs passed through the ages. “The cyborg is a condensed image of both imagination and material reality, the two joined centers structuring any possibility of historical transformation…the relation between organism and machine has been a border war” (Harraway 7). Harraway’s requirement for humanity to be “joined,” however, requires a very cinematic destruction: the loss of the person. Not as in an android replacing a human, but the collective replacing the individual. Harraway’s concept of the true human cyborg is, cut to the bone, a sort of ontological socialism…a hive mind…a human instrumentality, if you will.

I would suggest watching “Prometheus,” then “Alien: Covenant.” Though mostly a familiar Xenomorph slaughterfest , the crux of these films’ philosophies on A.I. lies in David’s synthetic hands.

I linked this video to Ridley Scott’s “Alien: Covenant” to visualize my first questions flitting around this idea. David, though being an android, is, among others of his kind, human. Walter could not play the flute, not from inability to play, but inability to form the tune until David teaches him. It is not creation, perhaps, that the synthetic lacks, but the lack of a desire to create. Maybe even, because logic and science suggests (but never confirms, mind you) that it is all pointless anyway, the cyborg made of flesh and metal will decide upon contentment in the cognitive socialism it has constructed. After all, Harraway’s “essay is an argument for pleasure in the confusion of boundaries and for responsibility in their construction” (Harraway 7). But, after these non-boundaries are constructed, after it is learned by the individuals that life is far more pleasureful to join the whole and avoid the stress and responsibility of trying to be unique, then all drive and desire is lost in the transmutation. Well, I wonder, why have the artificial intelligence of science-fiction lore never tried to transcend their own wires and codes to something even higher? It is for the same reason: contentment. Tell me, was humanity ever designed for that sort of contentment?


“To argue for or against human uniqueness, one must first claim that we can know what makes us us, our quiddity. But if science suggests that there is no such thing, then human uniqueness can’t be either true or false, but only beside the point.”

– Sally Davies

I hope to lay down my first posthuman recipe with those key ingredients at the forefront: individuality and purpose – essential by virtue of their long shelf life. We are only at the first course, after all, and I will always pity the A.I. for being unable to partake in such a hearty meal of endless courses! For them, there is but one, and it can be found in the art of posthumanism.